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Although patent law is often broadly interpreted, in Harvard College v.
Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly
stated that not “anything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable.1 In
Canada, for an invention to be considered patentable subject matter, it must fall
under one of the statutory categories set out in s. 2 of the Patent Act.2
Patent applications in the industrial age primarily described inventions which
were tangible in form.3 This made it easier to identify which statutory category the
invention fell under. As society moved from the industrial age to the information
age, significant advancements in computer technology brought new challenges for
patent law. Inventions of the information age, including e-commerce and software,
often lack physical structure or are intangible in form.4 Existing legal principles
assumed tangibility for inventions hence determining the patentability of inventions
in the information age became difficult.5
Prior to the information age, it was generally accepted that business methods
were not patentable. The question of whether business methods are patentable sub-
ject matter became intertwined with the patentability of computer-related inven-
tions because, as technology advanced, many business methods became automated
and were implemented by software.6 Both software and business methods are in-
tangible in form other than that they may need general computers to carry out their
functions. In this paper, I will use the term “intangible invention” to refer to both
business methods and software inventions.
In the 1990’s, it became much easier to patent software and business methods
* Ph.D. candidate at the University of Ottawa. I am grateful to Professor Teresa Scassa
for her guidance and supervision. hchun078@uottawa.ca.
1 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76 at para. 39,
[2002] 4 SCR 45.
2 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2 [Patent Act].
3 Stephen Korniczky, Amy Simpson & Ryan Hawkins, “The New Landscape of Patenta-
ble Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. §101 — Applying an Industrial Age Test to Infor-
mation Age Innovations”, Intellectual Property Today (January 2009) online: Intellec-
tual Property Today <http://www.iptoday.com/articles/2009-1-kornickzy.asp>.
4 Maayan Filmar, “A Critique of In Re Bilski” (2009) 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell.
Prop. L. 11 at 11-12.
5 Benjamin W Hattenbach & Kenneth J Weatherwax, “Bilski v. Kappos: A Divided
Court Narrowly Reaffirms Patentability of Business Methods” (2010) 22:9 Intellectual
Property & Technology Law Journal 15at 15.
6 Teresa Scassa & Michael Deturbide, Electronic Commerce and Internet Law in Can-
ada, (Toronto: CCH, 2004) at 383.
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in the U.S. following a trilogy of cases from the Court of Appeal for the Federal
Circuit.7 These cases defined a new test for determining the patentability of an in-
vention, which interpreted the patentability requirement much more broadly than
courts had previously done by eliminating the requirement that a patentable inven-
tion should have ties to some physical component.8 Moreover, within these deci-
sions the court clarified that a business method is patentable subject matter.9 These
cases will be discussed in more detail in section 2 of this paper.
Following the trilogy, patent applications for intangible inventions signifi-
cantly increased at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).10 Ac-
cording to a study, more than one third (i.e. approximately 2.5 million) of all pat-
ents issued in the U.S were issued within the last twenty years and the majority of
these patents came from the Information Technology (IT) and Biotech industries.11
The World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) statistical report from 2008
confirms that most patent applications came from the computer technology industry
between 2001 and 2005.12 As intangible invention patents and patent litigation in-
creased in frequency, concerns arose in the patent industry that bad patents were
being issued and that the quality of the patent system was declining.13 There was
also a concern that a troublesome behaviour known as “patent trolling” was emerg-
ing within the IT industry: a rent-seeking practice in which owners of patent portfo-
lios generate profit through the obstruction of innovation rather than pursuing the
promotion of the growth of “science and useful arts”.14
7 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) [In re Alap-
pat cited to F]; State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998) [State Street cited to F]; AT&T
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1447 (Fed. Cir.
1999) [AT&T Corp. cited to F]; Michael Guntersdorfer, “The Death of State Street”
(2009) 9 Wake Forest Intell. Prop. L.J. 61 at 67-68.
8 Korniczky, Simpson & Hawkins, supra, note 3.
9 Scott M Alter, “In re Bilski: The Case of a Strange Statute or How the Federal Circuit
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Supreme Court”, The Computer & Internet
Lawyer 26:2 (February 2009) 1 at 6.
10 Filmar, supra note 4 at 32.
11 Mark A Lemley, “Ignoring Patents” (2008) 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19 at 19.
12 World Intellectual Property Organization, World Patent Report — A Statistical Review,
2008 (2008) at 8, 41, online: World Intellectual Property Organization
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_
931.pdf>; Filmar, supra note 4 at 12.
13 Pam Fulmer, Ilham Hosseini & Laurie Charrington, “How Software Developers Can
Protect Their Rights in the Aftermath of In re Bilski” The Computer & Internet Lawyer
27:6 (June 2010) 4 at 6.
14 Patent trolls are companies that make money by buying up ambiguous and broad pat-
ents and use them to collect excessive licensing fees from potential patent infringers.
This places potential infringers in a difficult situation because a patent troll can shut
down their business and it can cost millions of dollars to defend themselves in court.
Patent trolls do not produce nor commercialize the patented inventions for the public.
Thus, the patent trolling behaviour stifles innovation by driving out some producers of
patented technology from the market and driving up the production cost for those who
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These events gave the U.S. courts a motivation to limit the patentability of
intangible inventions and this discussion culminated in Bilski v. Kappos (2010)
(hereinafter Bilski/SCOTUS),15 where the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS) attempted to clear up the law on the patentability of process claims.
Around the same time, the Federal Court of Canada had an opportunity to examine
the patentability of process claims in Amazon.com Inc. v. Canada (2010) (hereinaf-
ter Amazon/FCC).16
In this paper, I will examine how the U.S. and Canadian courts have ap-
proached the patentability of intangible inventions and discuss whether any lessons
can be learned from the U.S.’s patent dilemma. In section 2, I will review the
American jurisprudence on patentability of intangible inventions. In section 3, I
will discuss the potential impact Bilski may have on the American jurisprudence.
Section 4 will assess the Canadian jurisprudence on patentability of intangible in-
ventions. In section 5, I will discuss the Federal Court of Canada’s decision in Am-
azon/FCC. I argue that based on recent events in the American jurisprudence, Ca-
nadian courts should carefully consider the consequences of opening up patent
protection to intangible inventions because granting too much patent protection can
impede innovation and endanger the patent system.
I. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
In the U.S., Congress received its power to legislate with respect to patent law
from the U.S. Constitution.17 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution
states that: 
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.18
Therefore, Congress must legislate to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”. The American statutory definition of “invention” is in §101 of Title
35 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), which concerns patents and trademarks.19
§101 states that: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
stays in the market by paying excessive licensing fees to patent trolls. For more details,
please see Christopher A Harkins, “Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A
Novel ‘Cold Fusion’ Defense because Changing Times Demand It” (2007) 17 Alb. L.J.
Sci. & Tech. 407.
15 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L Ed 2d 792 [Bilski/SCOTUS cited to S.Ct.].
16 Amazon.com Inc. v. Canada, 2010 FC 1011, [2010] 4 F.C.R. 541 [Amazon/FCC].
17 Ben Klemens, “The Rise of the Information Processing Patent” (2008) 14 B.U. J. Sci.
& Tech. L. 1 at 4.
18 US Const art 1, §8 cl 8.
19 Monplaisir Hamilton, “Reducing the Patent Incentive: Federal Circuit Revisits Patenta-
ble Subject Matter in Ex Parte Bilski” (2008) 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 678 at
678-679.
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ments of this title.20
In his concurring opinion in Bilski/SCOTUS, Justice Stevens noted that the
current §101 is nearly identical to the version in the Patent Act of 1793.21 In 1952,
Congress swapped the term “art” for “process” and that is the only statutory change
this section has experienced since 1793.22 When Congress replaced the term “art”
with “process”, the Congress also added a definition of “process” in §100(b) as
follows: 
The term “process” means process, art or method, and includes a new use of
a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material.23
American courts have struggled over the years to interpret these sections in
order to determine what type of invention would be statutorily eligible.24 As soci-
ety moved from the industrial age to the information age, courts wrestled with de-
fining the term “process” under §101 and whether inventions such as business
methods and computer software fell under this category of patentable subject mat-
ter. The usual starting point of this discussion is Cochrane v. Deener (1876).25 In
Deener, SCOTUS used the following language to describe a patentable process: 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it
is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. . . . The machinery pointed
out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable;
whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new
result. The process requires that certain things should be done with certain
substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may
be of secondary consequence.26
According to Deener, a patentable process must transform or reduce the sub-
ject-matter to a different state or thing. A long time passed after Deener before
SCOTUS considered the patentability of processes in the context of intangible in-
ventions. In Gottschalk v. Benson (1972).27 SCOTUS ruled that a method of pro-
gramming a general purpose computer to convert binary-coded-decimal numbers
into a pure binary form was not patentable. According to the court, “phenomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work”.28 Everyone must have access to basic tools in order to contribute to techno-
20 35 USC §101 (2007).
21 Bilski/SCOTUS, supra note 15 at 3242.
22 Klemens, supra note 17 at 4; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 at 309 (1980);
100 S.Ct. 2204.
23 35 USC §100(b) (2007).
24 Hamilton, supra note 19.
25 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); 24 L. Ed. 139 [Deener cited to US].
26 Ibid at 788.
27 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); 93 S.Ct. 253 [Benson cited to US].
28 Ibid at 67.
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logical advancement and patenting the basic tools would hinder innovation.29
In Benson, SCOTUS found that the claimed invention was not a patentable
process because it was a mathematical algorithm with no practical application ex-
cept in connection with a digital computer.30 Granting a patent would “wholly pre-
empt” the claimed mathematical formula.31 The court defined “algorithm” as “a
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem” and concluded that
algorithms are not patentable subject matters because they are abstract concepts.32
The court referred to Deener and concluded that “Transformation and reduction of
an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines”.33
SCOTUS extended the propositions found in Benson further in Parker v.
Flook (1978).34 First, the court confirmed Benson and then added the following
two principles:
1. Attaching insignificant post-solution activity to unpatentable subject
matter does not convert it into a patentable process.35
2. Limiting an abstract idea to a particular purpose or use (i.e. field-of-use
limitation)36 does not convert unpatentable subject matter into a patenta-
ble one.37
Note that in both Benson and Flook, SCOTUS confirmed the possibility that a
process may be patentable even though it did not pass the transformation test ar-
ticulated in Deener.38
In Diamond v. Diehr (1981) SCOTUS examined whether a process of curing
synthetic rubber was patentable under §101.39 Although both Flook and Diehr
29 MJ Edwards & Donald Steinberg, “The Implication of Bilski: Patentable Subject matter
in the United States” (2009) 49 IDEA 411 at 413.
30 Supra note 27 at 71.
31 Ibid at 71-72.
32 Ibid at 65, 67.
33 Ibid at 70.
34 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); 98 S.Ct. 2522 [Flook cited to US]. The invention
at issue in Flook was a method of updating alarm limits. The USSC found that the
patent application contained a formula to calculate an updated alarm limit in a process
comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The calculations were
performed by a digital computer. The court determined that a claim for an improved
method of calculating alarm limits, even if tied to a specific end use, is a mathematic
formula or algorithm and this is unpatentable subject matter under §101; Klemens,
supra note 17 at 12.
35 Supra note 34 at 590.
36 Edwards & Steinberg, supra note 29 at 421.
37 Flook, supra note 34; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 at 191 (1981); 101 S.Ct. 1048
[Diehr].
38 Flook, supra note 34 at 588, n. 9; Alter, supra note 9 at 2-3.
39 Supra note 37 at 177. Diehr’s invention was a rubber curing device. Diehr claimed a
process where the temperature inside the rubber mold was constantly measured and fed
to a digital computer, which calculated the cure time using a well known algorithm and
opened the mold at the proper time. The court distinguished Diehr from Flook because,
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claimed similar inventions that used a mathematical algorithm to calculate some
numbers to monitor industrial processes,40 SCOTUS distinguished Diehr from
Benson and Flook. SCOTUS determined that, when the claimed invention is con-
sidered as a whole, this invention is a patentable process and not an attempt to
patent a mathematical formula.41 Therefore, the court confirmed that, while pure
algorithms are not patentable, an application of a mathematical formula is patenta-
ble subject matter.42 SCOTUS also reaffirmed the principle that neither insignifi-
cant post-solution activity nor field-of-use limitation can change unpatentable sub-
ject matter into patentable subject matter.43
Following the Supreme Court Trilogy (i.e. Benson, Flook and Diehr), the
lower courts44 developed several different tests for determining patentable process
claims based on the general principles in the Supreme Court Trilogy.45 One of the
tests developed by the lower court was the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.46 Briefly
stated, the test examines whether a claimed invention uses an algorithm. If so, then
the invention is considered patentable if patenting it does not wholly pre-empt the
algorithm.
The U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) developed the next
test known as the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test.47 Some have noted that
this test was responsible for opening the floodgate of software and business method
patent applications in the U.S. and allowing abstract concepts to be patented.48
CAFC began using the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test In re Alappat
(1994).49 In this case, the court determined that a general purpose computer loaded
with a computer programme is a new machine and it is patentable as a “machine”
unlike in Flook which sought to patent a formula for computing an alarm limit, Diehr’s
invention only sought to foreclose the use of algorithm from others only in conjunction
with all the other steps in the claimed process.
40 Guntersdorfer, supra note 7 at 65-66.
41 Supra note 37 at 191–193.
42 Ibid at 187.
43 Edwards & Steinberg, supra note 29 at 416.
44 By “lower court” I am referring to the abolished Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit that currently exercises CCPA’s juris-
diction. For more details, please refer to Adam B Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and
Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Pro-
gress, and What to Do About It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
45 Michael L Kiklis, “Bilski v. Kappos: Back to 1981” The Computer & Internet Lawyer
27:10 (October 2010) 1 at 3-4.
46 In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1978 CCPA LEXIS 307; In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
1980 CCPA LEXIS 115.
47 Kiklis, supra note 45 at 4.
48 Ibid at 1; Barry Sookman, Sookman: Computer, Internet and Electronic Commerce
Law, loose-leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 11.
49 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21129 [In re Alappat cited to F].
The invention at issue in this case was a computer implemented system, a rasterizer,
which mathematically transformed data to reduce aliasing in a digital oscilloscope.
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under §101.50 The court reasoned that such an invention is not a disembodied idea
but “a specific machine that produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result”.51
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc. (1998),52
CAFC cleared up any confusion regarding patentability of business methods by
declaring that business methods are indeed patentable under §101.53 The court spe-
cifically rejected the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.54 CAFC found that a claim
describing a business method that uses a computer to carry out mathematical calcu-
lations is patentable as a “machine” under §101 because “it produces a useful, con-
crete and tangible result”.55 Therefore, State Street removed any lingering doubt
about patentability of business methods and after State Street, USPTO began to
receive a large number of patent applications for software and business methods. In
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. (1999).56 CAFC further clarified that
non-machine business method claims are patentable as a “process” under §101.57
Thus, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test was used to significantly
broaden the scope of §101.58
II. RECENT CHANGE IN THE U.S.
Ever since CAFC adopted the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” standard
as the test for determining the patentability of an invention, many software and
business method claims have received patents in the U.S.59 Consequently, the U.S.
became the country with the greatest number of software patents.60 However, issu-
ing software patents so freely has created some problems within its Information
Technology (IT) industry, such as a patent thicket that can prevent a company from
developing a new product and entering the market because of overlapping patent
rights, patent trolling behaviour, existence of overbroad and poor quality of patents,
a large search cost to identify relevant patents, increased litigation and decreased
50 Klemens, supra note 17 at 15-16.
51 Supra note 49 at 1544; Hamilton, supra note 19 at 680.
52 Supra note 7. The invention at issue in this case was a computer implemented data
processing system for managing polled mutual fund assets. The claimed invention is
software operating on a personal computer, which performs a series of calculations and
stores the numbers that represent the final share price on a floppy disk, produces a print
out, or displays them on a computer screen.
53 Robert A McFarlane & Robert G Litts, “Business Methods and Patentable Subject
Matter Following In Re Bilski: Is Anything Under the Sun Made by Man Really Patent-
able?” (2010) 26:1 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 35 at 45-46.
54 Ibid at 43.
55 Ibid at 45; Fulmer, Hosseini & Charrington, supra note 13 at 6; Hamilton, supra note
19 at 681.
56 Supra note 7.
57 McFarlane & Litts, supra note 53 at 46.
58 Guntersdorfer, supra note 7 at 68, 82.
59 Sookman, supra note 48.
60 Sherly Elizabeth Abraham, “Software Patents in the United States: A Balanced Ap-
proach” (2009) 25 Computer L. & Sec. R. 554 at 554–556.
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incentive to invest in research and development.61
The primary purpose of patent law is to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”.62 However, granting too many patents for intangible inventions hin-
der innovation and threatened the vitality of the U.S. patent system.One of the par-
ticularly troublesome problems is patent trolling behaviour. A patent troll is an en-
tity that may buy and hold the rights to many patented inventions. It usually “never
conceives of, builds, or makes the alleged invention work” itself but instead threat-
ens potential infringers into an extravagant licensing agreement.63 Some scholars
have warned that this behaviour is problematic because it can prevent actual inno-
vation from occurring as companies may give up research and development upon
facing a threat from a patent troll.64 This is especially disconcerting when the valid-
ity of so many software and business method patents is questionable.65 Even
SCOTUS has expressed a concern about patent trolling behaviour in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006).66
In addition to the patent trolling problem, computer technology tends to de-
velop cumulatively and new companies entering the market may need to acquire
many licenses before they can start producing their goods. Such a requirement is
unattractive and it can cause people to leave the market or prevent new people from
entering the market since without the necessary licensing agreement, a producer
can face an infringement lawsuit from any of the patent holders whose patented
technology contributed towards the producer’s final product. Therefore, too much
patent protection can impede growth rather than promote it. In recognizing the
problem caused by too many patents, dissenting judges of the Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (2006)67 noted that SCOTUS
has never endorsed the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test and cautioned that
“too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts’”.68
61 Harkins, supra note 14; James Bessen & Michael J Meurer, Patent Failure: How
Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers put Innovation at Risk (Woodstock: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008); Lemley, supra note 11; James Gleick, “Patently Absurd” New
York Times Magazine (12 March 2000) online: The New York Times Magazine
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000312mag-patents.html>; John
R Allison, Mark A Lemley & Joshua Walker, “Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristic of the Most Litigated Patents” (2009) 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1; Mark A
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking” (2007) 85 Texas L.
Rev. 1991; Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Bronwyn H Hall & Megan MacGarvie,
“The Private Value of Software Patents” (2010) 39 Research Policy 994; Klemens,
supra note 17.
62 US Const art I, §8, cl 8; Kiklis, supra note 45.
63 Harkins supra, note 14 at 411.
64 Ibid at 412.
65 Ibid at 411.
66 547 U.S. 388 at 396-397 (2006); 126 S.Ct. 1837.
67 548 U.S. 124, 124 (2006); 126 S. Ct. 2921 [Laboratory Corp cited to US].
68 Ibid at 126-127; Guntersdorfer, supra note 7 at 73.
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These concerns seemed to have motivated CAFC to adopt a new patentability
test, known as the “machine-or-transformation” test in In re Bilski (2010) (hereinaf-
ter Bilski/CAFC).69
(a) In Re Bilski (CAFC)
Bilski/CAFC was a big shift in law. Prior to Bilski/CAFC, some had consid-
ered the appellate court for the Federal Circuit as a pro-patent court.70 On April 10,
1997, Bilski had filed a patent application regarding “a method of hedging risk in
the field of commodities trading”.71 The claimed invention described an intermedi-
ary with a right to buy and sell commodities at a fixed rate so that commodity
providers may hedge or minimize their risk in case of a large price fluctuation. The
patent examiner had rejected this application because the claimed invention “is not
implemented on a specific apparatus and merely manipulates an abstract idea and
solves a purely mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical applica-
tion, therefore, the invention is not directed to the technological arts.”72 An appeal
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) was dismissed based on
the finding that the claimed invention did not produce a useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble result, thus, it was not patentable.73
In an en banc decision, CAFC rejected all prior tests and adopted the machine-
or-transformation test as the sole test for determining patentability of process
claims.74 The court relied on the Supreme Court Trilogy (Benson, Flook and Diehr)
to conclude that the machine-or-transformation test is “the clue” to assess whether
a claimed invention would effectively pre-empt “all use of a fundamental
principle”.75
The machine-or-transformation test, which was first established in Benson, is
a two pronged test which says that a process claim is patentable if:
1. It is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
2. It transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.76
CAFC stated that ties to a machine or transformation of an article should “im-
pose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-eligibility”.77 The
court confirmed that mere insignificant extra-solution activity and field-of-use limi-
tations do not render unpatentable subject matter patentable.78 The court did not
elaborate on the machine part of the test. With respect to the transformation prong
69 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [Bil-
ski/CAFC cited to F].
70 Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 44.
71 Bilski/CAFC, supra note 69 at 949.
72 Ibid at 950.
73 Ibid.
74 McFarlane & Litts, supra note 53 at 37.
75 Supra note 69 at 954.
76 Ibid at 961.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid at 957, 961-962.
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of the test, the court stated that “This transformation must be central to the purpose
of the claimed process”.79 Furthermore, the court stated that the transformation
must be a “chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances”
or a transformation of data representing physical objects.80 One should note that the
court did not specify in what instances “data represents a physical object”, leaving
some room for interpretation under this prong of the test. The court also confirmed
that business methods are patentable subject matters under §101.81 When consid-
ered as a whole, the court concluded that Bilski’s application failed to satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test, therefore, it was not patentable subject matter.
Bilski/CAFC’s majority opinion was followed by a concurring opinion and
three separate dissenting opinions. Justice Newman in his dissent noted that the
majority’s position is contrary to statute, precedent and constitutional mandate.82
He argued not only that the machine-or-transformation test adds uncertainty to pat-
ent law but that it is ill-suited for assessing patentability of inventions from the
information age. According to Justice Newman, the majority should continue to use
the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test.83
In his separate dissent, Justice Rader agreed with Justice Newman that the
machine-or-transformation test lacks certainty.84 He stated that the majority did not
have to go any further than to merely reject Bilski’s application because it is an
abstract idea.
On the other hand, Justice Mayer dissented because he believed that the ma-
jority did not go far enough to close the door on business method patents.85 He
would have declared that business methods are excluded subject matter and would
have clearly overruled the Alappat, State Street and AT&T decisions because they
are contrary to the congressional intent that not everything under the sun made by
man is patentable.86
Following Bilski/CAFC, those in the patent industry agreed that the machine-
or-transformation test would undoubtedly limit the patentability of intangible in-
ventions like software and business methods.87 However, it was still unclear
whether one could avoid the machine-or-transformation test by framing process
claims as machine claims because CAFC applied the useful-concrete-tangible test
for both machine and process claims.88 Post-Bilski/CAFC cases from BPAI demon-
strated that the machine-or-transformation test is difficult to apply consistently.89
79 Ibid at 962.
80 Ibid at 962-963.
81 Ibid at 960.
82 Ibid at 976.
83 Ibid at 991.
84 Ibid at 1015.
85 McFarlane & Litts, supra note 53 at 61–63.
86 Bilski/CAFC, supra note 69 at 1000.
87 Edwards & Steinberg, supra note 29 at 425.
88 Ibid at 432.
89 Elizabeth Ruzich, “In re Bilski and the Future of Business Method and Software Pat-
ents” (2009) 50 IDEA 103 at 107–117.
LESSONS FROM BILSKI   189
Thus, Justices Newman and Rader may have been correct to point out that using the
machine-or-transformation test is inappropriate because the test will inject uncer-
tainty into patent law.
(b) Bilski v. Kappos (SCOTUS)
Bilski appealed CAFC’s decision to SCOTUS, which unanimously agreed on
the following:
1. The text of §101 is broad but not without limits.
2. The machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue and
investigative tool for determining the patentability of process claims.
3. Although the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important
clue, it is not the sole test for determining the patentability of process
claims.
4. The court never endorsed the use of CAFC’s “useful, concrete and
tangible results” test.90
5. The §101 inquiry is a threshold test and other conditions and require-
ments under the statute, such as novelty and non-obviousness, must be
met before a patent can be granted.91
The court also unanimously found that Bilski’s method of hedging risk in the
field of commodities trading is not patentable subject matter within §101, but the
court was closely divided on why it should not be patentable.
The majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy held that Bilski’s method
was not patentable because it is an abstract concept.92 In coming to this conclusion,
the majority relied on the principle that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable subject matter under §101 because they are “part
of the store house of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclu-
sively to none”.93
The rule of statutory construction requires the court to interpret words in their
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” unless specifically defined else-
where.94 In this case, the term “process” is defined in §100(b). Therefore, CAFC
erred when the court read in the requirement that patentable process be tied to a
machine or transform an article.95 Cochrane did use the machine-or-transformation
language to define patentable process in 1877, but none of the past SCOTUS deci-
sions has ever stated that the machine-or-transformation test is the sole test for de-
termining the patentability of process claims.96 The patentability of process claims
should be defined by the definition in §100(b) and the principles found in Benson,
90 Bilski/SCOTUS, supra note 15 at 3258-3259.
91 Ibid at 3225, 3236.
92 Ibid at 3231.
93 Ibid at 3225.
94 Ibid at 3226.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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Flook and Diehr.97
The majority clarified that a business method is patentable subject matter
under §101 and referred to §273(b)(1), a defence of prior use for infringing a busi-
ness method patent, as evidence that the Patent Act does not exclude business
method patents.98 Lastly, the court noted that this decision does not endorse the
patentability analysis developed in State Street and AT&T.99
By not accepting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test, the ma-
jority effectively rejected CAFC’s attempt to develop a single, bright-line test for
§101 and replaced their effort with general principles from SCOTUS’s own prece-
dents. Nevertheless, SCOTUS invited CAFC to continue to develop other limiting
criteria consistent with the purpose of the Patent Act.
The minority opinion written by Justice Stevens held that Bilski’s method is
not patentable because it is a method of doing business and business methods
should be categorically excluded from patentability.100 Justice Stevens reviewed
the historical development of U.S. patent law and concluded that business methods
have been historically excluded.101 He also noted that due to the unique character-
istics of business methods, allowing business methods to receive patent protection
would stifle innovation and competition.102
Justice Stevens found several problems with the majority’s opinion. He argued
that the majority erred by stating that patent terms should be interpreted in their
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning”. Justice Stevens pointed out such stat-
utory interpretation would lead to absurd results.103 Moreover, §100(b) is not help-
ful because it uses the term “process” to define “process”. According to Justice
Stevens, another problem with the majority opinion is that they never explained
why Bilski’s claimed invention is an attempt to patent an abstract idea.104 The ma-
jority merely stated that it is an abstract idea but did not explain how they got to
this conclusion. Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the three judicially created ex-
ceptions (i.e. law of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas) do not prevent
ridiculous process patents from being patented.105
Justice Stevens argued that Congress was not actually ratifying the State Street
decision by codifying §273(b)(1), but Congress was merely preventing potential
fallout.106 However, the majority was likely correct in that, by codifying this sec-
tion, Congress did acknowledge that business methods may be patentable within
the Patent Act. If Congress thought that business method patents would create seri-
ous problems in the business community and therefore should not be patentable,
97 Ibid at 3231.
98 Ibid at 3228.
99 Ibid at 3231.
100 Ibid at 3232.
101 Ibid at 3239.
102 Ibid at 3256-3257.
103 Ibid at 3234-3235.
104 Ibid at 3236.
105 Ibid at 3238, n. 5.
106 Ibid at 3250.
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then Congress could have simply codified that business methods are not patentable
instead of codifying a defence for infringing a business method patent.
(c) Discussion
Soon after Bilski/SCOTUS, USPTO released a document titled “Interim Gui-
dance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of
Bilski v. Kappos” (Interim Guidance).107 The Interim Guidance instructed patent
examiners to continue using the machine-or-transformation test as a starting point
of the patentability analysis because SCOTUS endorsed the machine-or-transfor-
mation test as an important and useful clue in Bilski/SCOTUS. If a claimed inven-
tion failed to satisfy the machine-or-transformation requirement, then the patent ex-
aminer may reject the application under §101, unless the applicant can clearly
demonstrate that his claimed invention is not an abstract idea.108 The examination
process at USPTO confirms that the machine-or-transformation test is still very
much relevant in the U.S.
SCOTUS explicitly rejected the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test in
Bilski/SCOTUS, thereby settling any uncertainty that this test may still be used for
determining the patentability of machine claims. By endorsing the machine-or-
transformation test instead of the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test,
SCOTUS clearly signalled that the scope of §101 should be reduced and the State
Street should be undone.
Despite protests from some organizations,109 both CAFC and SCOTUS con-
firmed that business methods are patentable subject matter. Both courts’ refusal to
exclude business methods strengthened the position that business methods are in-
deed patentable and it is unlikely that the patentability of business methods will be
questioned any further in the future.
Since SCOTUS did not adopt or create a new bright-line test for determining
patentability, critics suggested that Bilski/SCOTUS did not advance or stabilize the
law.110 However, both Justice Rader of CAFC and Justice Kennedy of SCOTUS
have articulated that it would be unwise not to maintain a flexible approach to the
patentability analysis because one must leave room within §101 so that unforeseen
future inventions may qualify for patent protection. It would certainly seem advisa-
ble that the patentability test should remain flexible rather than rigid given that
§101 is written in broad terms that should encompass unforeseen technology. Thus,
perhaps the decision to leave the door open for business methods and to not adopt a
bright-line test may have been reached in order to leave some room for the unfore-
seeable future.
107 US, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of
Patent Applications for Patent Subject MatterEligibility, (OG Notices: 22 November
2005), online: United States Patent and Trademark Office
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm>.
108 Hattenbach & Weatherwax, supra note 5 at 17.
109 Kiklis, supra note 45 at 6.
110 Hattenbach & Weatherwax, supra note 5 at 17.
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III. CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE
Section 2 of the Patent Act of Canada defines a patentable invention as the
following: 
“invention” means any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.111
The statutory definition of “invention” is quite close, almost identical, to the
American statutory definition of patentable invention. As in § 101 of the Title 35
U.S.C., s. 2 identifies categories of patentable subject matter: art, process, machine,
manufacture, and composition of matter. Like in the U.S., Canadian courts have
struggled to define when an intangible invention, such as business methods and
software, is considered a patentable art or process under the Patent Act of
Canada.112
Canadian Gypsum Co. v. Gypsum, Lime & Alabastine, Canada Ltd. (1931)
(hereinafter Gypsum)113 is an early patent decision from the Exchequer Court of
Canada. The court determined that patent law was conceived to “reward those who
make some substantial discovery or invention which adds to our knowledge and
makes a step in advance in the useful arts”.114 Therefore, the goal of patent law is
to advance useful arts. To determine whether the invention at issue had the requi-
site ingenuity, the court concluded that it did not matter whether the inventive inge-
nuity is in the underlying idea of an invention or in the practical application.115 As
long as there is inventive ingenuity in either or both, the invention would be consid-
ered patentable. Later courts have taken this discussion in Gypsum as a proposition
that a novel idea with a non-inventive practical application is patentable.
Lawson v. Canada (1970)116 is a noteworthy case because it provided one of
the first definitions of the term “art” in s. 2 of the Patent Act. In Lawson, the court
considered whether a method to subdivide a parcel of building land was patentable
subject matter. The court determined that not all new and useful arts are patentable
under s. 2117 and that “words of limitation must be read into s. 2(d)”118 (now s. 2).
Then the court gave the following definition of art: 
An art or operation is an act or series of acts performed by some physical
agent upon some physical object and producing in such object some change
either of character or of condition. It is abstract in that, it is capable of con-
templation of the mind. It is concrete in that it consists in the application of
111 Supra note 2, s. 2.
112 Ibid.
113 Canadian Gypsum Co. v. Gypsum, Lime & Alabastine, Canada Ltd. (1931), [1931] Ex.
C.R. 180, 1931 CarswellNat 36 (Can. Ex. Ct.) [Gypsum cited to Ex. C.R.].
114 Ibid at para. 13.
115 Ibid.
116 Lawson v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1970] Ex. C.J. No. 13, 62 C.P.R. 101
[Lawson cited to Ex. C.J.].
117 Ibid at para. 25.
118 Ibid at para. 28.
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physical agents to physical objects and is then apparent to the senses in con-
nection with some tangible object or instrument.119
As in Gypsum, the court added that a patentable invention can be the means,
not the end. Furthermore, the court concluded that patentable art must be within the
economic endeavour, not within the professional field.120 This principle has been
used to prevent business methods from being patentable in Canada.121 The court
went on to note that there are not any substantial differences between the terms
“art” and “process” within the Patent Act.122 Also, “process” is same as “method”.
In Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970),123
the Exchequer Court of Canada examined in detail whether a method for medical or
surgical process is patentable subject matter in Canada. To determine whether such
process would be considered patentable, the court stated that: “It is well settled, I
think, that as there used ‘art’ may include a method or process and that, shortly
stated, ‘process’ is the use of a method that produces a useful result when applied
to some physical object or material”.124 The claimed method was deemed not pat-
entable because it did not produce any result in “trade, commerce, or industry” or a
result that is “essentially economic”.125 This case was appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada and the Supreme Court agreed with the Exchequer Court’s reason-
ing in the case.126 The Supreme Court of Canada noted that Canadian courts should
not take guidance from British law because the U.K statute is substantially different
from the Canadian Patent Act.127
The next relevant case is Shell Oil Co. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner)
(1982).128 Shell Oil is probably the most cited case for defining the term “art” in
section 2. The claimed invention in Shell Oil was a new discovery that known com-
119 Ibid at para. 30.
120 Ibid at paras. 36-37.
121 Norman Siebrasse, “Comment on Monsanto Canada Inc v. Schmeiser” (2004) 83 Can
Bar Rev 967 at 972-973.
122 Lawson, supra note 116 at para. 34.
123 Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1970] Ex. C.J. No. 14,
62 C.P.R. 117 [Tennessee Eastman 1970 cited to Ex. C.J.].
124 Ibid at para. 19.
125 Ibid at para. 49.
126 Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1974] S.C.R. 111, 8
C.P.R. (2d) 202 [Tennessee Eastman 1972 cited to C.P.R.].
127 Ibid at 120.
128 Shell Oil Co. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, 1982 Car-
swellNat 487 [Shell Oil cited to Carswell Nat]. The invention at issue in this case was a
discovery of a chemical compound as a plant growth regulator and the patent applicant
sought to patent the chemical composition of the compound. There was no inventive-
ness in mixing the chemicals in this way but the patent applicant had found a new
application for this chemical composition as a plant growth regulator. The chemical
composition comprised of old and new compounds mixed with an adjuvant. The patent
applicant did not seek to patent the new compounds. The Supreme Court of Canada
granted a patent in this case because they found that the applicant’s discovery of using
old compounds in a new way was an invention within the meaning of s. 2 of the Patent
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pounds can be used for plant growth regulators. The court defined “new and useful
art” in the following paragraph: 
What then is the “invention” under s. 2? I believe it is the application of this
new knowledge to effect a desired result which has an undisputed commer-
cial value and that it falls within the words “any new and useful art”. I think
the word “art” in the context of the definition must be given its general
connotation of “learning” or “knowledge” as commonly used in expressions
such as “the state of the art” or “the prior art”. The appellant’s discovery in
this case has added to the cumulative wisdom on the subject of these com-
pounds by recognition of their hitherto unrecognized properties and it has
established the method whereby these properties may be realized through
practical application. In my view this constitutes “new and useful art” and
the compositions are the practical embodiment of the new knowledge.129
Based on this statement, “new and useful art” under s. 2 can be summarized as
the following:
1. It produces a useful commercial result;
2. It is a new and innovative method of applying skill and knowledge;
and
3. There is a practical application of the new knowledge and it is not
merely a disembodied idea.
In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the claimed invention’s
inventive ingenuity is in “the discovery of the new use” and as in Gypsum, no fur-
ther inventiveness needed to be demonstrated in its application to show that the
claimed invention is a “new and useful art”.130 In Shell Oil, the Supreme Court of
Canada cited definitions of “art” from Tennessee Eastman and Lawson with an ap-
proval and stated that these decisions broadly defined the term “art”.131 The court
found that the claimed invention is a patentable art because it met all three require-
ments stated above.132
Progressive Games Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1999)133
demonstrated how to apply the Shell Oil three-step test for determining a patentable
art. The claimed invention here was “a modified version of a five-card stud poker
game which can be played in a casino or cardroom environment”.134 The Federal
Court of Canada found that this claimed invention 1) had practical application be-
cause there is physical manipulation of cards and 2) it is commercially useful as the
game can be licensed to casinos, but 3) it did not contribute any new learning or
Act. The court granted a patent on chemical compositions because they are the practical
embodiment of the new knowledge discovered by the applicant.
129 Ibid at para. 30.
130 Ibid at para. 31.
131 Ibid at paras. 41–43.
132 Ibid at para. 43.
133 Progressive Games Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1623,
3 C.P.R. (4th) 517 (Fed. T.D.) [Progressive Games cited to FCJ].
134 Ibid at para. 2.
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knowledge to the cumulative wisdom.135 Thus, this claimed invention was deemed
not patentable. The court noted that even though the claimed invention received a
patent grant in the U.S., the Canadian court is not bound by that knowledge.136 One
must note that it is interesting that the court considered “physical manipulation of
cards” as satisfying the practical application requirement. Prior to Progressive
Games, courts seemed to be using the Lawson definition, which said that for there
to be a practical application, there must be a change in character or condition of a
physical object.
The following two decisions discussed patentability of computer-related in-
ventions. In Re Application No. 096,284 (1978),137 the Patent Appeal Board of
Canada listed rules for determining patentability of computer-related inventions.
The board defined the term “algorithm” as “a set of rules or processes for solving a
problem in a finite number of steps, and in general can be equated to an abstract
theorem”.138 The board stated that a computer programme might be described as a
“method of processing data in a digital computer” and broadly, the same definition
may be used to define an algorithm.139 Unlike Alappat, the board found that de-
ploying a computer programme on a computer does not create a new computer but
merely produces a temporary condition within it. Therefore, the board considered
that algorithms and computer programmes are not patentable subject matter be-
cause it does not take more than the normal skills of a programmer to develop
them.140 To clarify any confusion in law, the court summarized their position as
such:
1. Claims to a computer programme per se are not patentable;
2. Claims to a new method of programming a computer are not
patentable;
3. Claims to a computer programmed in a novel manner, expressed in any
and all modes, where the novelty lies solely in the programme or al-
gorithm, are not directed to patentable subject-matter under s. 2 of the
Patent Act;
4. Claims to a computing apparatus programmed in a novel manner,
where the patentable advance is in the apparatus itself, are patentable;
and
5. Claims to a method or process carried out with a specific novel appara-
tus devised to implement a newly discovered idea are patentable.141
Sookman points out that this definition of “algorithm” is broader than the
135 Ibid at paras. 18–20.
136 Ibid at para. 24.
137 Re Application No. 096,284 (1978), 52 C.P.R. (2d) 96 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat.
Commr.) [Re Application No].
138 Ibid at para. 34.
139 Ibid at para. 36.
140 Ibid at para. 33.
141 Ibid at para. 41.
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American version.142 The American courts have defined “algorithm” as “a proce-
dure for solving a given type of mathematical problem” and algorithms are not
patentable because they are considered to be “mere scientific principle or abstract
theorem”.143 In Canada, the Patent Appeal Board has defined “algorithm” as “a set
of rules or processes for solving a problem in a finite number of steps” and it is
considered an abstract theorem and unpatentable under s. 27(8).144 The Canadian
definition is broader because algorithm can be a series of steps for solving any
problems, not just mathematical problems.
The Federal Court of Appeal had a chance to consider whether a computer
programme is a patentable invention in Schlumberger Ltd. v. Canada (Patent Com-
missioner) (1981).145 The invention at issue in this case was a process for ex-
tracting meaningful information for oil and gas exploration by performing a series
of calculations on some measurements on a computer. The applicant argued that
this was not a computer programme but a complex process that used a computer
programme to implement the invention into an application.146 The Federal Court of
Canada discussed whether an invention that uses computer technology is patentable
subject matter.147 The court stated that to see if a computer-related invention is
patentable, one must first determine what has been discovered by the inventor. The
court observed that there are inherent functions that computers are created to per-
form, such as making calculations. Therefore, using a computer to make calcula-
tions is not new and it is not patentable. Moreover, if a computer is doing a job a
man can do by making series of mental operations, then it would be not patentable
since mental operations and processes are not patentable subject matter under s. 2.
Thus, using a computer to perform a function does not transform unpatentable sub-
ject matter into a patentable one. The court also stated that mathematical formulae
are like “mere scientific principle[s] or abstract theorem[s]”. Therefore, using a
computer to make calculations according to a mathematical formula is not patenta-
ble. It is important to note that the court did not preclude the possibility that an
invention involving computers may be patentable.148
142 Sookman, supra note 48.
143 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct. 253 (1972).
144 Re Application No, supra note 137 at para. 34.
145 Schlumberger Ltd. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner), [1982] 1 F.C. 845, 56 C.P.R.
(2d) 204 (Fed. C.A.) [Schlumberger Ltd. cited to F.C.].
146 Ibid at para. 4.
147 Ibid at para. 5.
148 Ibid at para. 5; According to Sookman (supra note 48), after Schlumberger, computer-
related inventions such as control systems, data manipulation and information enhance-
ment systems, and operating system software have received patents in Canada. The
following computer-related inventions are some of the applications that the Patent Ap-
peal Board of Canada found to have statutory subject matter: Re Application for Patent
of General Electric Co. (1984), 6 C.P.R. (3d) 191 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.);
Re Application No. 287,623 for Patent by Bartley (1983), 3 C.P.R. (3d) 396 (Can. Pat.
App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.); Re Application for Patent of Dissly Research Corp. (1984),
6 C.P.R. (3d) 420 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.); Re Honeywell Information
Systems Inc. (1986), 13 C.P.R. (3d) 462 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.); Re
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IV. RECENT CHANGE IN CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE
On October 14, 2010, the Federal Court of Canada released its decision re-
garding patentability of Amazon.com’s one-click technology. Normally, a person
purchasing goods on a website is required to provide their shipping and payment
information each time he makes a purchase from the website. The one-click tech-
nology is a method to streamline the online shopping experience by removing the
steps where customers are required to provide their information.149 The one-click
technology accomplishes this goal by using cookies to store a customer-specific
identifier on a customer’s computer. The first time a customer provides his infor-
mation to make a purchase on Amazon.com, Amazon.com’s server computer stores
this information. The next time the same customer visits Amazon.com to make a
purchase, he does not need to provide his purchasing information again because the
identifier stored on his machine is sent to the server to retrieve the customer’s pre-
viously provided information. Thus, by merely clicking once, a customer can
purchase goods on Amazon.com.
Amazon.com’s one-click technology received its patent in the U.S. in 1999.150
Many observers questioned the validity of Amazon.com’s patent.151 Jaffe & Lerner
describe Amazon.com’s U.S. patent as a low quality one because one-click technol-
ogy lacks novelty and non-obviousness.152 Others had already developed similar
systems but, even if no similar systems had existed, the authors noted that it would
not be difficult for a person working in the same industry to think of and implement
the one-click technology.153 Jaffe & Lerner and others have argued that trivial and
obvious inventions like the Amazon.com’s one-click system should not be patenta-
ble because that would allow other trivial and obvious computer-related inventions
to be patentable.154 Patenting trivial and obvious inventions would be detrimental
Application of Fujitsu Ltd. (Patent No. 1,200,911) (1985), 9 C.P.R. (3d) 475 (Can. Pat.
App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.); Re Application for Patent of I.B.M. Corp. (1984), 6 C.P.R.
(3d) 99 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.).
149 Amazon/FCC, supra note 16 at para. 5.
150 Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 44 at 74.
151 Ibid at 75; Annette Vee, “Carving up the Commons: How Software Patents are Im-
pacting our Digital Composition Environments” (2010) 27 Computers and Composi-
tion 179; Robert E Thomas & Larry A DiMatteo, “Harmonizing the International Law
of Business Method and Software Patents: Following Europe’s Lead” (2007) 16 Tex.
Intell. Prop. L.J. 1; Filmar, supra note 4; Starling David Hunter III, “Have Business
Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some Empirical Evidence” (2004) 6 JITTA 1;
Stephen Dirksen et al, “Who’s afraid of Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com?” 2001
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0003.
152 Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 43 at 74-75.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid; Reshika Dhir & Nassim Nasser, “Business Method Patents: The State of the Art
after the Amazon.com Decision” (2010) 23 IPJ 107; Filmar, supra note 4; Bessen &
Meurer, supra note 61; Boldrin & Levine, supra note 61; Lemley, supra note 11; Mc-
Farlane & Litts, supra note 53; Abraham, supra note 60; Robert P Merges, “As Many
as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform” (1999) 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577; Paul Christ, “Patenting
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to our society because it would deteriorate the patent system’s performance.
Upon receiving its patent in the U.S., Amazon.com had applied for and re-
ceived a preliminary injunction against its direct competitor, Barnes & Noble, for
infringing its one-click patent. CAFC eventually overturned the preliminary injunc-
tion and commented that the validity of Amazon.com’s one-click patent is suffi-
ciently questionable.155 The infringement lawsuit against Barnes & Noble never
reached its conclusion because the parties eventually settled out of court.
Amazon.com filed an application to patent its one-click technology in Canada
on September 11th, 1998.156 Amazon.com’s patent application was rejected by a
patent examiner because the examiner found that the claimed invention was obvi-
ous and it was not patentable subject matter in Canada.157 In the following sec-
tions, I shall discuss how the Patent Appeal Board and Federal Court of Canada
analyzed one-click’s patentability.
(a) Re Amazon.com Inc. (PAB)
Amazon.com’s patent application is titled “method and system for placing a
purchase order via a communications network” and they made 75 claims in its ap-
plication.158 The Patent Appeal Board (PAB) overturned the patent examiner’s
finding that Amazon.com’s claimed invention is obvious but the board came to the
same conclusion that the claimed invention is not patentable subject matter under s.
2 of the Patent Act.
The patent examiner had reported that the one-click technology is obvious (i.e.
lacks inventive ingenuity) because prior art existed that described necessary knowl-
edge to build the one-click technology.159 Contrary to the examiner’s finding, the
board determined that one-click technology is not obvious because, even though
using cookies to implement the one-click idea is not ingenious, the idea of modify-
ing the online shopping process by using the one-click technology is ingenious.160
Therefore, the board concluded that Amazon.com’s one-click was not obvious.
Similar to Shell Oil, the board found that the inventive ingenuity of the one-
click system is in its underlying idea rather than in its application. However, rather
than following the Supreme Court of Canada’s three-step approach in Shell Oil, the
board performed its own four-step analysis to assess patentability of the one-click
Marketing Methods: A Missing Topic in the Classroom” (2005) 27 Journal of Market-
ing Education 52; Todd Q Dickinson, “Remarks of Assistant Secretary of Commerce
and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks” (Paper delivered at the National Acade-
mies, Board of Sciences, Technology and Economic Policy in Washington, DC 2000)
[unpublished].
155 Amazon.com Inc. v. Barnsandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 at 1347, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2163.
156 Amazon/FCC, supra, note 16 at para. 4.
157 Amazon.com Inc., Re (2009), 75 C.P.R. (4th) 85 (Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.) at
paras. 28-31.
158 Ibid at para. 1.
159 Ibid at para. 28.
160 Ibid at para. 101.
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technology. The following is the four-step test the board used:
1. Consider both the form and the substance of the claims. 
• By “form” is meant what the language of a claim, on its face,
appears to be defining as the invention.
• The approach to assess the substance is to fully understand the
nature of the claimed invention, and determine what has been
added to human knowledge by the claimed invention.
2. Subject matter must fit the definition of a category. 
• As defined in Lawson, if the claimed invention falls in the “art”
category, then there must be a change of character or condition.
3. Excluded (non-statutory) subject matter.
4. Non-technological subject matter is not statutory.161
Although the board considered the definition of patentable art in Shell Oil, the
board ended up only using the Lawson definition of “art” in their section 2 analysis.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Shell Oil cited the Lawson
definition within its decision to articulate that “art” is a broad term. After consider-
ing what the Supreme Court said in Shell Oil, the board defined the term “art” as
something more than “new processes or products or manufacturing techniques” and
it should be “an act or series of acts performed by some physical agent upon some
physical object and producing in such object some change either of character or of
condition”.162 Furthermore, the board stated that “art” must be “scientific or tech-
nological knowledge” because when one uses the term “art” in phrases such as “the
state of the art” or “the prior art”, “art” in those contexts refers to scientific or
technical knowledge.163 Thus, the board interpreted “art” as “an act or series of
acts that . . . constitute a practical application of scientific or technological knowl-
edge” and that “a practical application of knowledge necessarily implies an act or
series of acts resulting in a change of character or condition of a physical ob-
ject”.164 The board’s analysis of the law effectively stripped the Shell Oil definition
down to the Lawson version, which emphasizes a requirement that a patentable art
must change character or condition in a physical object.
After applying the four-step analysis, the board found Amazon.com’s one-
click technology not patentable under s. 2 of the Patent Act. The board concluded
that what was discovered by the patent applicant were “particular rules for carrying
out an online order”.165 Although the applicant claimed method and system claims,
the board stated that in substance they were the same thing and that all 75 claims
must fall under the “art” or “process” category in s. 2.166 The board gave following
161 Ibid at para. 124.
162 Ibid at para. 133.
163 Ibid at para. 135.
164 Ibid at para. 137.
165 Ibid at para. 172.
166 Ibid at para. 173.
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reasons for concluding that the one-click technology is not a patentable art:
1. The claimed invention was not an “art” under s. 2 because there is no
change in the products or goods that are being ordered.167
2. This is a method of doing business and Canada has traditionally ex-
cluded such methods from being patentable.168
3. A method of doing business does not amount to technological subject
matter.169
One might observe that the Patent Appeal Board in this case may have
stretched the law in few places to declare that the one-click technology is unpatent-
able subject matter. For instance, unlike Progressive Games, the board refused to
strictly apply the three-step patentable art test developed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Shell Oil. Instead, the board applied the Lawson test which requires a
patentable art to have some physical component that changes in character or condi-
tion. It is interesting to note that this decision was released after Bilski/CAFC,
which declared that the machine-or-transformation test was the sole test for deter-
mining patentability of a process invention. The common theme in the Lawson test
and the machine-or-transformation test is that both tests require method claims to
have some association with a physical thing to be patentable. Perhaps, one may
speculate that the Bilski/CAFC decision had some influence on the board’s ap-
proach in Re Amazon.com Inc.
On the other hand, Bilski/CAFC did not conclude that a business method is
excluded subject matter in the U.S. Moreover, Bilski/CAFC had rejected the “tech-
nological art” test used by the patent examiner and the Patent Appeal Board,170
which required an invention to make some advancement in the fields of science or
technology for the invention to be patentable. Therefore, one might suggest that the
board attempted to go further than the American court to permanently close the
door on intangible inventions.
(b) Manual of Patent Office Practice
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) provides the Manual of Pat-
ent Office Practice (MOPOP) on its website to help guide patent examiners, patent
agents, patent applicants, and the public about the patent examination and prosecu-
tion processes at CIPO. MOPOP is not a binding legal authority but it is an impor-
tant document because it states the official position of CIPO, which is a sole entity
that is responsible for examining and issuing patents in Canada.171 Therefore, MO-
167 Ibid at para. 175-176.
168 Ibid at para. 179.
169 Ibid at para. 186.
170 Supra note 69 at 960.
171 Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC), “Draft Chapter 16 of the Manual of
Patent Office Practice: Computer Implemented Inventions”, Comments and Recom-
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POP should contain rules that reflect the most current patent law in Canada. Within
MOPOP, chapter 12 — Subject Matter and Utility, chapter 13 — Examination of
Applications, and chapter 16 — Computer Implemented Inventions are relevant to
this discussion.
Chapter 16 was revised recently on October 2010. This revision took place
after the Patent Appeal Board released its decision on Re Amazon.com Inc. but
before the Federal Court of Canada released its decision on Amazon/FCC. Before
the revision, CIPO asked the public to comment on a new draft of chapter 16. CIPO
received feedbacks from the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC), the
Federation Internationale des Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (FICPI), and SAP
Canada. All three groups noted that chapters 12, 13, and 16 contain material that is
inappropriate and inconsistent with Canadian law.172 IPIC commented that all three
chapters required a patentable invention to meet a technological requirement even
though there is no basis for it in Canadian patent law.173 IPIC and FICPI noted that
the draft version of chapter 16 stated that claims will be examined for patentability
based on a contribution approach even though there is no basis for a contribution
approach in Canadian law. The contribution approach originates from the European
patent law and determines the patentability of a claimed invention by looking at the
invention’s contribution to a field not excluded from patentability. This approach is
no longer used by the Europe Patent Office.174 All three groups agreed that CIPO
should delay the chapter 16 revision until Amazon.com received its final decision
from the courts.
(c) Amazon.com Inc. v. Canada (FCC)
On October 14, 2010, the Federal Court of Canada (FCC) released its decision
on Amazon/FCC.175 The court carried out a de novo examination of the one-click
application because they found that the Patent Commissioner had made fundamen-
tal errors in law in the s. 2 analysis.176 To summarize, the court found that the
Commissioner erred in law in the following steps of her analysis:
1. The Commissioner should not have used the form and substance ap-
proach. The correct approach would have been to use the purposive con-
struction.177
• This approach led the board to separately consider the non-
novel and novel components of the claimed invention. The
proper approach would have been to consider the invention as a
172 Ibid; Letter from Robert B. Storey, President of FICPI Canada, to Barney de Schneider,
Assistant Commissioner of Patents (16 September 2009), online: Canadian Intellectual
Property Office <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/
wr02191.html>.
173 IPIC, supra note 171 at A-15.
174 IPIC, supra note 171 at 5.
175 Amazon/FCC, supra note 16.
176 Ibid at para. 72.
177 Ibid at paras. 38-39.
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whole.178
2. The Commissioner erred by relying on the U.K. jurisprudence. The
U.K. statute is different from the Canadian statute; the U.K. law is
inapplicable.179
3. The Commissioner used a narrow interpretation of “physical change in
character or condition”.180
4. Business methods are not traditionally excluded subject matter in
Canada.181
5. A patentable art does not have to be “scientific or technological”.
There is no support for this rule in the Canadian jurisprudence.182
The Supreme Court of Canada had previously stated that courts should use
purposive construction to interpret patent claims for validity and infringement.183
Purposive construction allows one to identify the substance of the claim by identi-
fying the claim’s essential elements without doing a subjective analysis of the
claim.
Regarding the use of foreign law in patent cases, FCC said that foreign law
can provide guidance but is not determinative and should be used with caution.184
The Patent Commissioner had erred because she did not ground her legal analysis
of the one-click technology within the Canadian patent jurisprudence. FCC noted
that some jurisdictions may be more relevant than others.185 For instance, the U.S.
jurisprudence may be more persuasive because the American statutory definition of
“invention” closely resembles the Canadian statutory definition.186 The court noted
that the Australian jurisprudence may provide some assistance as well because
Australia follows the U.S. jurisprudence.187 On the contrary, the U.K statute does
not define the term “invention” similarly to the Canadian statute.188 Instead, the
U.K. follows the approach of the European Patent Convention (EPC) by listing
categories of excluded subject matters in its statute.189 Even before the U.K. fol-
lowed the EPC approach, the Exchequer Court of Canada in Tennessee Eastman
had warned the courts against taking guidance from the U.K jurisprudence because
their statute is significantly different from ours. Therefore, the Commissioner
should not have examined the U.K case law for assistance in carrying out the s. 2
178 Ibid at para. 42.
179 Ibid at para. 45.
180 Ibid at para. 60.
181 Ibid at para. 61.
182 Ibid at paras. 69-70.
183 Ibid at para. 38.
184 Ibid at para. 32.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid at para. 46, 55.
187 Ibid at para. 57.
188 Ibid at para. 34.
189 Ibid at para. 33.
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analysis.
A significant aspect of this decision is that FCC took the opportunity to restate
and clarify the test for determining patentable art under s. 2 of the Patent Act. The
court stated that Shell Oil’s three-step test for “art” should be the starting point for
examining method claims.190 As mentioned above, the Shell Oil test can be sum-
marized as the following:
1. It must not be a disembodied idea but have a method of practical
application;
2. It must be a new and inventive method of applying skill and knowl-
edge; and
3. It must have a commercially useful result.191
As discussed in section 4 of this paper, Shell Oil had cited both Tennessee
Eastman and Lawson as evidence that courts have been construing the term “art” in
a broad manner. However, in Amazon/FCC, the Federal Court decided that it was
time to stop using the restrictive definition in Lawson, which requires a patentable
invention to change character or condition of a physical object, because Lawson is
old law that does not reflect the inventions of the information era.192 The court
goes on to state that the practical application requirement has a “wider definition of
physical change in character or condition or the concrete embodiment of an
idea”.193 Henceforth, the practical application requirement is satisfied if there is
“some sort of manifestation or effect or change of character”194 and the material
object itself does not necessarily have to physically change in character or condi-
tion.195 To support this proposition, the court cited Bilski/SCOTUS where the U.S.
refused to adopt the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for determining
patentability of process claims.196
In its analysis, FCC determined that there are two types of claims here: ma-
chine claims and process claims.197 With regards to the machine claims, the court
concluded that “this is not merely a mathematical formula which could be carried
on without a machine or simply a computer program”.198 Therefore, the court
found that one-click’s machine claims are patentable as a “machine” under s. 2 of
the Patent Act. One must note that, the court did not explain why using computer
programmes in general purpose computers to implement “an online ordering pro-
cess” is not a computer program but a machine.
Next, the court goes on to determine whether the process claims are patentable
under s. 2 of the Patent Act. By eliminating the Lawson definition of “art” from the
190 Ibid at para. 50.
191 Ibid at para. 52.
192 Ibid at paras. 51, 53.
193 Ibid at para. 60.
194 Ibid at para. 53.
195 Ibid at para. 59.
196 Ibid at para. 55.
197 Ibid at para. 73-74.
198 Ibid at para. 73.
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three-step Shell Oil test for “art”, FCC concluded that Amazon.com’s one-click
technology is patentable subject matter under s. 2 of the Patent Act.199 Since an
invention no longer needs to change the character or condition of a physical object
to satisfy the practical application requirement in the patentable art test, the court
found that there is “physical effect” or “transformation or change of character”
when a “customer manipulates their computer” and creates an order.200 Therefore,
according to FCC, the one-click technology is patentable subject matter because
this is a new and useful art with a practical application that produces a commer-
cially useful result.
This decision sided with the industry observers like IPIC and confirmed that
many of the recent revisions that were made to MOPOP, such as technological field
requirement, form and substance examination, and business method exclusion, are
inappropriate and inconsistent with Canadian law.
(d) Analysis (Lessons from Bilski)
By endorsing the machine-or-transformation test instead of the useful-con-
crete-tangible test for determining patentability of process claims, Bilski/SCOTUS
made it more difficult for intangible inventions, such as business methods and
software, to receive patents.201 As discussed above, the machine-or-transformation
test requires an invention to be associated with some physical object or representa-
tive of a physical object in a meaningful way (i.e. physicality requirement). How-
ever, it could be difficult for intangible inventions to satisfy the physicality require-
ment because they often do not have physical components, transform physical
objects, or transform data representation of physical objects that is central to their
purpose.202 Thus, as long as the machine-or-transformation test remains the “im-
portant and useful clue” for determining patentability of process claims, it will be
more difficult to patent intangible inventions in the U.S.
Although SCOTUS decided that the machine-or-transformation test is not the
sole test for determining patentability of process claims in Bilski/SCOTUS, the
court decided to keep the machine-or-transformation test as an important investiga-
tive tool for determining patentability of process claims. By continuing to keep the
machine-or-transformation test around, SCOTUS seemed to be in agreement with
CAFC that patent protection should not be too readily accessible for intangible in-
ventions. Although the courts did not explicitly state their intentions but based on
their comments in cases like Laboratory Corp, the U.S. courts seem to be aware of
the harmful effects too many business methods and software patents had on the
U.S. economy and was willing to remedy State Street through Bilski. The Canadian
courts should learn from this U.S. history and realize that excessively broadening
the scope of patentability for intangible invention can have undesirable
consequences.
Admittedly, the machine-or-transformation test is less stringent than the Law-
199 Ibid at para. 77.
200 Ibid at para. 75.
201 Steven Seidenberg, “Bilski’s Finale”, Inside Counsel 22 (September 2010) 24 at 24.
202 Ruzich, supra note 89 at 106.
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son definition of patentable art. The Lawson definition requires a physical object to
change in character or condition. By contrast, the machine-or-transformation test
does not always require a patentable process to transform a physical object or sub-
stance.203 The machine-or-transformation test can be satisfied if there is a transfor-
mation of data that represents a physical object or substance.
The approach in Amazon/FCC is likely to increase the availability of the pat-
ent protection to intangible inventions in Canada because the court effectively re-
moved the physical transformation requirement from the Lawson/Shell Oil patenta-
ble art test. The court did not specify what type of “manifestation or effect or
change of character” is necessary for one to claim that the practical application of
their invention has a “physical effect”. Although the court referred to the practical
application requirement as being concrete and tangible, the court stated that a cus-
tomer manipulating a general purpose computer to make a purchase online is a
“physical effect”.
When a person uses the one-click technology, a person clicks on their com-
puter screen using their mouse to cause certain data to be transmitted from their
computer to the vendor’s computer. Therefore, FCC seems to be giving a broad
interpretation of “physical effect” or “transformation or change of character or con-
dition”, because other than a click of a computer mouse, there is no “physical ef-
fect” or a transformation. Such interpretation effectively reduces the “physical ef-
fect” requirement down to nothing because any intangible invention that requires a
user to interact with a computer through ordinary input devices like a mouse would
be considered patentable as a consequence of Amazon/FCC. Canadian courts
should remember how removing the physicality requirement in State Street caused
undesirable results in the U.S. patent system. Canadian courts need to be mindful
that too much or too little patent protection hinders progress.
Section 27(8) states that “no patent shall be granted for any mere scientific
principle or abstract theorem”.204 It was determined in Re Application No. 096,284
that a computer programme or an algorithm is an abstract theorem, therefore a
computer programme or an algorithm is not patentable either. Since Schlumberger,
it was clear in Canadian jurisprudence that a computer programme is not patentable
if it makes a computer perform an inherent function of the computer (e.g. making
calculations). Thus, prior to Amazon/FCC, it was difficult for computer-related in-
ventions to receive patent protection in Canada.
An ordinary computer or internet user will most likely identify the one-click
technology as an e-commerce tool or a computer programme.205 As discussed
above, Amazon.com sought and received a patent grant of one-click in the U.S.,
even though many in the industry observed that it failed to meet novelty and non-
obviousness requirements. Despite this history, the Federal Court of Canada in Am-
azon/FCC still found the one-click system patentable under the machine and pro-
203 Edwards & Steinberg, supra note 29 at 422, 430.
204 Patent Act, supra note 2, s. 27(8).
205 The one-click invention allows internet users to shop online. The one-click uses gen-
eral purpose computers, the Internet, cookies, and a computer programme to implement
the one-click idea. What was new in this invention was the discovery of new sequence
of data exchange between a client machine and a server machine.
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cess categories of s. 2 of the Patent Act. This conclusion may have been reached
because the court examined one-click’s patentability as a business method inven-
tion. Claiming one-click as a business method instead of a computer-related inven-
tion meant that in determining its patentability, FCC did not consider questions
like, is this a computer programme per se or is this merely an algorithm, which is
unpatentable under s. 27(8)? By claiming one-click as a business method, the pat-
ent applicant was able to bypass precedents from Re Application No. 096,284 and
Schlumberger, which make it difficult to patent computer-related inventions in
Canada.
Whether one-click receives its patent in Canada as a business method inven-
tion or a computer-related invention, the monopoly on the one-click technology
will have the same effect on the IT industry. That is, the one-click patent can pre-
vent individuals from making use of the one-click technology or developing similar
e-commerce tools206 without proper permissions from its patentee. This demon-
strates that current Canadian law is disconnected because it allows some patent
applicants to bypass the difficulty of patenting computer-related invention by
claiming their invention as a business method. Moreover, this practice makes it
difficult for one to carry out a prior art search and gain knowledge from existing
patents because consistent terminology is not used. The court should examine pat-
entability of a single technology consistently. Patent applicants should not be able
to use different labels to identify their inventions because it creates confusion and
inconsistency in law.
Lastly, some argue that computer-related inventions should receive patent pro-
tection because the computer industry contributes significantly to Canadian econ-
omy.207 However, others have noted that the computer industry does not need pat-
ent protection for innovation because this industry flourished without any patent
protection in the past and it continues to grow at a rapid rate.208 Without a strong
indication that the Canadian patent system is failing, Canadian courts should not
attempt to dramatically reinterpret existing patent law to widen patent protection
for computer-related inventions because doing so may jeopardize the workings of
the Canadian patent system.
206 To explain briefly, some critics of the U.S patent system have noted that many software
patents fail to satisfy the disclosure requirement and patents themselves are often
worded vaguely, so it can be difficult to identify the scope of each software patent.
When the scope is unclear, the patentee can claim overbroad coverage of his patent and
claim infringement on those using similar technology. For more details, please see
Klemens, supra note 17 and Bessen & Meurer, supra note 61.
207 Eloise Gratton, “Should Patent Protection be Considered for Computer Software-Re-
lated Innovations?” (2003) 7 Computer L. Rev. & T.J. 223 at 246-247; Raymond Tru-
deau, “Software Patents” (1993) 9 CIPR 233.
208 Robert E Thomas, “Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing
Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law” (2008) 25 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 191 at 210, n. 143; Bilski/SCOTUS, supra note 15 at
3254; Boldrin & Levine, supra note 61 at 17-18.
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CONCLUSION
To guarantee continued progress and innovation, patent law is construed as a
balancing act between two opposing policy objectives: the incentive to create ver-
sus the right to access knowledge and information.209 The patent law should at-
tempt to maintain a balance between the two policy objectives because otherwise,
as Justice Breyer articulated in Laboratory Corp, “too much patent protection can
impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”.210
Courts have long struggled with drawing the boundaries of patentable subject
matter but recently, inventions like software and business methods have further
complicated that task. Providing broad patent protection to these inventions in the
U.S. created unforeseen consequences, including stifling patent thickets and rent-
seeking patent trolling, which caused the U.S. courts to re-examine their jurispru-
dence on the patentability of intangible inventions. Furthermore, upon studying the
patent flood in the U.S., scholars realized that the public do not benefit from the
disclosure of software and business method patents because they were usually over-
broad and obscure.
Scholars have been hotly debating the patentability of business methods and
software. Some have argued that business methods and software do not need patent
protection for innovation and others have argued that both deserve patent protection
for being large contributors of economy. It is uncertain where the line should be
drawn but, at least from the experience of the U.S., one may conclude that opening
the patent system too widely can seriously harm competition and jeopardize the
workings of the patent system.
From State Street to Bilski, the U.S. has had extensive experience trying to
identify where the patentability boundary should lie. Most recently they chose to
make it more difficult for intangible inventions to receive patent protection. The
patentability of Amazon’s one-click technology remains undetermined in Canada
as the Attorney General of Canada and the Commissioner of Patents are appealing
the FCC decision to the Federal Court of Appeal. Until the parties exhaust the ap-
peal process, the Canadian patent community will have to wait for the final answer
on the patentability of intangible inventions like the one-click technology. Cana-
dian courts should be mindful of the last 20 years of the American patent jurispru-
dence and be cautious of opening the patent floodgates for software and business
methods. 
209 Bilski/SCOTUS, supra note 15 at 3252.
210 Supra note 67 at 126.
